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Applying Analytics to the NFL Draft: Athletic Performance
Measures as a Predictor of Future Success

Owen Brower
The University of Puget Sound1
December 2020
Can an athlete’s National Football League’s (NFL) Scouting Combine measurements be used to
predict their future success in the League? In this analysis, I use historical combine data to create
a grading system that measures a player’s athleticism, regressed upon the player’s rookie year
Pro Football Focus (PFF) grade to determine the extent to which athleticism can help NFL
franchises better predict the outcomes of their draft picks.
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1. Introduction
In this paper I analyze and theorize on how NFL teams, like major league baseball teams
have been doing for years, can use historical statistical data to evaluate the efficacy of their draft
picks and use that information to make better picks going forward. This is relevant because the
structures set in place to pay professional athletes are complex due to the difficulties that come
with objectively quantifying and analyzing their contributions, and reveal inconsistencies
involved in player valuation relative to their contribution to the long-term wealth of the
franchise. Methods of valuation for players across many professional sports do not mirror one
another and vary depending on a multitude of factors unique to the sport. What is consistent,
however, is that in nearly all professional sports, the primary means of fresh talent acquisition is
through a draft. A draft is a process in which players—in most cases—who have recently
become eligible enter a pool of other prospects from which the professional franchises take turns
selecting them, claiming their rights until they become eligible for their next contract. In most
sports, the draft—and the selections allotted to each franchise—is one of the most valuable
methods of talent acquisition, as it offers lottery ticket-esque payouts; teams get to acquire the
rights to players that have a chance to far out-perform the contracts they sign, as they have never
had their value measured against their new professional competition.
Understandably, franchises are always looking for new methods to ensure a return on any
investment, but when the investment can offer the potential returns that the draft can, it is even
more critical to ensure the Franchise has done its due diligence. Professional sports franchises
have always needed ways to help quantify the performance of their employees and being able to
mitigate the risk associated with investing in an employee who has no direct industry experience
can offer a critical edge in team building. Analytics in sports are still a relatively new concept,
first popularized by baseball franchises barely half a century ago (Lindsey, 1959). Not only is
this development novel, it is still relatively narrow: The focus of the econometrics associated
with sports are mainly only utilized for data involving Major League Baseball (MLB). Hakes and
Sauer (2006) provide an economic evaluation of the Moneyball story, covering the performance
of players and their payoff to the organization employing them within MLB. The book
Moneyball is one of the foundations of sports analytics, and it tells the story of how one
innovative manager working for the Oakland Athletics successfully exploited an inefficiency in
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baseball's labor market over a prolonged period of time. In their article, Hakes and Sauer apply
standard econometric procedures to data on player compensation, as well as productivity, from
1999 to 2004, concluding that these methods support Lewis's argument in Moneyball that
specific baseball skills were inefficiently valued during the earlier parts of this period, and that
this inefficiency was profitably exploited by managers with the ability to generate and interpret
statistical knowledge as the players aged in their careers. As popular as sports analytics may be
in the MLB, this method of player valuation and economic impacts has been widely untapped
and under researched within the NFL labor market.
While the draft-based hiring process has been modeled quite thoroughly in MLB, and the
success of applied analytics in the league helped push the trend to other professional sports
leagues, unfortunately, that method of player valuation and economic impacts has been widely
untapped and under researched within the NFL labor market. Theo Epstein, the current President
of Baseball Operations for the Chicago Cubs, is a classic example of how this process has not
been adopted from MLB to the NFL. Mr. Epstein did not receive his job on the basis of his
baseball acumen; it wasn’t earning runs that got Epstein his job, instead it was the bachelor’s
degree from Yale, then his juris doctor from the University of San Diego. Moneyball was
seemingly enough to prove the model to the MLB, but the NFL has been altogether more
skeptical of applied analytics. However, with the salary cap continuously rising and player
contracts becoming more valuable each year, the NFL has been forced to come to terms with the
fact that creating methods for reliable player valuation based on quantifiable returns is nonoptional. This was revealed at the most recent MIT SLOAN Sports Analytics Conference, when
one of the key articles, titled “PFF WAR: Modeling Player Value in American Football”, posited
that the issue of player valuation was one of the biggest facing the NFL (MIT SLOAN, 2020).
The researchers presented a rigorously developed model to help solve the issue of player
valuation with players already in the NFL. However, while similar articles are becoming more
widely available and the NFL is becoming more open to embracing minds of statisticians, the
issue of predicting value prior to entering the professional ranks remains largely unresearched.
Using aggregate data collected from the NFL combine and Pro Football Focus, this study
aims to measure how administered tests of athletic potential at the NFL Scouting Combine can
be used to predict the returns that a franchise will receive from drafting a player, measured by
that player’s on-field contributions during his rookie season. The NFL draft has historically been
3

an unpredictable, lottery-esque guessing game: After four years, players drafted following the
second round (players drafted in the third, fourth, through the seventh round) are only still on the
team that drafted them ~15% of the time (Doll, 2014). Given that rookie contracts are awarded
on a set pay-scale—so if a team drafts a rookie who winds up playing incredibly well, they have
him playing for far less than he is likely worth for up to five years—keeping the players on those
contracts around is of massive importance to NFL franchises. Now, that is only the case when
the player’s on-field performance matches or exceeds his pay. In this study, I aim to fill the gap
in player valuation models to not look at the proper value for a player’s second or third contract,
but for their first. In the following section, I will cover more thoroughly the methods through
which player valuation models have been developed for NFL players, as well as introducing
other studies aimed at modeling the value of draft selections.

2. Literature Review
Professional sports are markets just like any other, and just like any other market, there
are strong economic implications to be drawn from the data. The story begins with baseball,
illustrated by Michael Lewis (2003) in his analysis of the “Moneyball” era in MLB. Grier and
Cowen (2011) report Lewis’s “Moneyball” theory, which argues that the valuation of players
according to their slugging percentage statistic results in an over-inflation in the reward structure
relative to a players on-base percentage. Lewis’ analysis challenges the current reward structure
for MLB, ultimately finding that on-base percentage was a larger indicator of wins, and therefore
profits for the organization (Lewis, 2003). In further analysis of the “Moneyball” theory, Hakes
and Sauer (2006) conduct linear regression analyses to find the correlation of on-base percentage
as an indicator of the contribution a batter has to a team’s winning percentage. Hakes and Sauer
find that on-base percentage is a statistically significant predictor of the team’s winning
percentage, pointing to how the team may value this player by the league’s reward system.
Further verifying the “Moneyball” theory, the researchers use this data to study the labor market
valuation of the players based on their measurable skills, positional attributes, and length of time
played on a professional level. Their data, measuring the salaries and athletes’ performance from
2000 to 2004, are used to compare the salaries of players and their on-base and slugging
percentage. This includes various control variables, accounting for home run hitters, catchers,
infielders, first basemen/DH’s, and outfielder’s as different positions are valued differently,
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affecting their salaries. The results of this analysis prove that a player’s salary in correlation to
his contribution to the team’s winning percentage is undervalued by the MLB.
As highlighted in the aforementioned article from most recent MIT SLOAN Sports
Analytics Conference, “this problem has been addressed at various levels of satisfaction in
baseball, basketball and hockey, it has largely been unsolved in football, due to unavailable data
for positions like offensive line and substantial variations in the relative values of different
positions” (MIT SLOAN, 2020). The body of literature for those leagues vastly outweighs the
research performed in the NFL, and as the researchers mentioned, it is often simply due to the
nature of football itself. The sport is noisy and the data are noisy; nearly every play features
multiple distinct interactions between every distinct operator on the field, and each operator is
tasked with performing a unique job. To help combat this noise, the authors introduce the use of
Pro Football Focus data: “Pro Football Focus (PFF) offers hope in the area of player valuation
due to its unique player grades, which provide play-by-play participation and performance data
for each player on the football field, from the quarterback to the gunner on the punt team” (MIT
SLOAN, 2020). Using normalized data for player performance, they are able to replicate a model
that has become central in player valuation across numerous sports: wins above replacement
(WAR). WAR found its origins in baseball, where it was used to place a value on how many
more wins a player is worth than a replacement-level player at their same position. It has been
translated into nearly every sport following its introduction, but prior to the most recent Sports
Analytics Conference had limited applications in the NFL. Yurko et al. took publicly available
play-by-play data to create a wins-above-replacement model with values for quarterbacks,
receivers and running backs (2019). Within their study, they mention that, using an approach
similar to that of Citrone and Ventura’s A Statistical Analysis of the NFL Draft: Valuing Draft
Picks and Predicting Future Player Success (2017), teams could substitute an objective measure
of WAR in place of the more subjective, yet more popular measure of “approximate value” (AV)
(Pro-Football-Reference, 2018), to project the future career value in terms of WAR for players
entering into the NFL draft. By using PFF data in their study, the MIT SLOAN researchers were
able to address many of the issues that were present in the two articles mentioned following the
first: The inability to provide results for all positions, and the issue of whether or not the results
account for the noise associated with play-by-play data.
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Another study, “Draft now, lose later: Evaluating NFL prospects' draft stock based on
character concerns” from 2014, centers around another facet of the talent acquisition equation,
which is whether the NFL draft is a hiring process, just like any other labor market. That article
discusses the research into the relationship between a person with a criminal record will
determine his or her subsequent success in the labor market. In this case, the author applies this
research to NFL draft prospects with off-field character concerns and examines their success in
the NFL following their draft. The author looked at all 1,016 players who were drafted into the
NFL between 2010 and 2013 to determine whether character concerns, specifically arrest records
and team conflicts, had any impact on a player’s draft status. To narrow it down even further, the
author looked at whether college football players who only had a history of non-criminal related
suspensions negatively affected their NFL draft stock more than those who had an encounter or
encounters with law enforcement. The author found that, on average, having an arrest record
accompanied by formal criminal charges led to being selected a half a round later than those
without an arrest record and formal criminal charges. By any measure, being draft later
materially impacts a player’s initial pay scale.
Seeing as hiring in any field comes with inherent risk for the employer, and that that risk
is increased exponentially when the employees are nineteen to twenty-three year old kids, the
need for predicting performance is clear. The research modeling performance in the league is
thorough but looking at predictive models for the performance of draft prospects shows gaps in
the literature. In Evaluating talent acquisition via the NFL draft, Barney et al., sought answers to
a number of questions regarding the success of players drafted over a twelve-year period (2000
through the 2012 draft and league season). To do so, they measured the cost of acquiring players
through the draft and the success of those players once acquired. The authors used two main
metrics for measuring the cost of drafted players: The first is the round in which a player is
taken, and the second used a table of draft pick values initially developed within the NFL in the
early 1990s. The authors also employed two metrics for measuring the success of drafted players.
The first assigned a value to each player’s performance for a season, and the second was created
using a weighted score that takes into account games played, games started and recognition as a
top player. The authors found that drafting safeties provided the highest average return, but on
average teams spent the most to acquire quarterbacks, defensive ends and offensive tackles. They
find that, in regards to what they define as “cost effectiveness”, centers, guards, and kickers are
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undervalued on average while cornerbacks are overvalued (Barney et al., 2013). This study was
rife with problems, most critically though were the means of performance valuation; they used a
subjective measure—recognition as a top player—along with the claim that games played and
started is a reliable measurement of performance.

3. Data
This study uses data from Pro Football Reference on the NFL Scouting Combine from
2016 to 2019 (https://stathead.com/football/nfl-combine-results.cgi), along with each players’
Pro Football Focus grades for their rookie season (https://pff.com). The dataset includes 395
observations between 2016 and 2019, only including the players who participated in each event
at the NFL Scouting Combine and who played enough snaps in their rookie seasons to receive a
PFF grade. Furthermore, all position groups are not created equal. Some position groups’ success
is determined by unmeasurable factors, and intangible abilities that they possess that will allow
them to succeed despite poor measurable traits. This prompted me to exclude one position group
from the data frame and subsequent regression models: quarterbacks. The quarterback position
is, in practical terms, impossible to forecast. By virtue of that position group’s success being
almost entirely reliant on these previously stated unmeasurable traits and intangible qualities2, I
have omitted this group from the data.
Figure 1.

2

This study aims to determine whether or not an advantage in athleticism aids rookies in their transitions to
the NFL (ie., do they play better than a less athletic counterpart would), for evidence that this does not apply to
the quarterback position look no further than Tom Brady.
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The dataset includes fields for each players’ name, their draft year (Year), their human
measurements (Age, Height, Weight), their combine event measurements (40YD is their forty
yard dash time, in seconds, Vertical is their standing vertical jump, in inches, BenchReps is the
number of repetitions performed with 225LBS on the bench press, in repetitions, the Broad Jump
is their standing broad jump, in inches, 3Cone is their three cone time, in seconds and Shuttle is
their twenty yard shuttle time, in seconds), the college where they played their final College
Football season, the NFL team that drafted them (if they were drafted) and their rookie year PFF
grade. The PFF grade was not available for each rookie initially included in the dataset, which
can be seen in Figure 1, where count is equal to 304 for PFF grade. There are numerous reasons
as to why a rookie would not receive a PFF grade, be it injury or being buried on the depth chart.
Regardless, these players will not be included in this analysis.
To create a normalized measurement of an NFL hopeful’s athleticism, the dataset is
grouped based on players’ positions, and the average and standard deviation for each combine
event is calculated for each position. The descriptive statistics for each position group can be
found below:
Figure 2. Cornerbacks
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Figure 3. Safeties

Figure 4. Linebackers

Figure 5. Running backs
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Figure 6. Offensive Linemen

Figure 7. Interior Defensive Linemen

Figure 8. Edge Rushers
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Figure 9. Tight Ends

Figure 10. Wide Receivers

To create a player’s athleticism score for each event the average result of that event for the
player’s position is subtracted from the player’s measured result in that event. The resulting
number is then divided by the standard deviation of that event for the player’s position, to
provide a numeric representation of how many standard deviations away from the positional
average that player is. The formula for a given player’s athleticism score for a given event is
below:
Figure 11. Athleticism Score Formula
Scorep,e = (Resultp,e – AvgResultpos,e) / StDevpos,e
p = player entity, e = event, pos = position
Certain combine event results are interpreted differently—ie., the higher the number, the better
the broad jump, the lower the number, the better the forty-yard dash—and this holds true for the
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athleticism scores for different events. Descriptive statistics for athleticism scores for each event,
across all positions, is given below:
Figure 12. Athleticism Score Descriptive Statistics

From Figure 12, it is clear that the vast majority of players from this dataset were not far from
average across all events; the mean score for each event was within one one-hundredth of a
standard deviation from the norm, and fifty percent of all players were within less than one
standard deviation from the norm for each event. The ranges of scores for all events, with the
exception of bench score and forty-yard dash score, were fairly evenly distributed, and the
standard deviations were even across events.

4. Model and Econometric Techniques
To measure a franchise’s returns on the investment of drafting a player, this analysis uses
the player’s rookie season PFF grade. While this may not entirely encapsulate the impact that
player had on his team that season, it is the most widely accepted objective measure of player
performance. As such, this will be the dependent variable for each of the following regression
models. For the initial model, the equation is below:
Model #1
Pff_Gradei = 0 + 1 Heighti + 2 Weighti + 3 40yd_scorei + 4 vert_scorei + 5 vert_scorei +

6 bench_scorei + 7 broad_scorei + 8 3cone_scorei + 9 shuttle_scorei + positioni +
drafted_byi + ui

12

The initial model includes all position groups, using the full dataset. It includes dummy variables
for the player’s position and the team that drafted them (drafted_by). The model also includes
variables for a player’s height and weight to capture variance that may be explained by physical
stature.
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The coefficients for the variables drafted py and position have been omitted from the output. For
the position variable, the coefficient was only positive for cornerbacks. The coefficients were
statistically significant for tight ends (value: -9.05674, p-value: 0.06528 (.)), offensive linemen
(value: -24.48045, p-value: 0.00338 (**)), linebackers (value: -13.22491, p-value: 0.00209 (**)),
interior defensive linemen (value: -23.03423, p-value: 0.00312 (**)) and edge rushers (value: 13.91306, p-value: 0.00586 (**)). The sign of those coefficients indicates that, on average,
cornerbacks receive the highest PFF grades as rookies out of all positions. The coefficients for
the variable encompassing the team that drafted the player, fourteen out of thirty-two teams had
coefficients that were statistically significant. The New Orleans Saints (value: 10.10657, p-value:
0.01436 (*)), Buffalo Bills (value: 11.41486, p-value: 0.0051 (**)) and the Carolina Panthers
(value: 10.03280, p-value: 0.01408 (**)) all had values above 10, meaning that, on average, their
rookies receive PFF grades at least ten points higher than rookies on other teams. The results of
the model indicate that a one-pound increase in bodyweight increases a player’s rookie year PFF
grade by 0.2, and while this is statistically significant, the difference of 0.2 in their grade is
negligible. However, the coefficients for three cone score and forty-yard dash score are both
statistically significant and negative. The negative coefficient is logical in the case of these
scores, because a larger value in either score indicates a slower player. The forty-yard dash score
indicates that a one-unit increase in a player’s forty-yard dash score results in, on average, over a
two-point decrease in rookie year PFF grade. Similarly, a one-unit increase in a player’s threecone score causes, on average, nearly the same decrease in their rookie year grade. Both R2
values for this model show that these variables are not explaining a large portion of the variance
observed in rookie year PFF grades (R2: 0.258, Adjusted R2: 0.11). While those values are
certainly low, they are not unexpected: athleticism is inarguably important in the NFL, but it
cannot possibly account for the majority variance in play simply due to the intricacies of football.
In order to improve upon this model, the data were broken into subsets by position group,
and the same regression, with the exception of the position and drafted by dummy variables, was
performed upon each new subset of data. The results from each subsequent model for wide
receivers, safeties and linebackers can be found below:
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Table 2 contains the results for the regression analysis performed upon the wide receivers subset,
with the regression equation below:
Model #2
Pff_Gradei = 0 + 1 Heighti + 2 Weighti + 3 40yd_scorei + 4 vert_scorei + 5 vert_scorei +

6 bench_scorei + 7 broad_scorei + 8 3cone_scorei + 9 shuttle_scorei + ui
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The R2 and Adjusted R2 indicate that the athleticism scores explain a much larger percentage of
the variation observed in wide receivers’ rookie year PFF grades than they did for the entire
dataset (0.545, 0.471 versus 0.258 and 0.11, respectively). Considering that the wide receiver
position tends to favor smaller, faster and quicker players than other positions, the increase in
explained variance can be logically attributed to the fact that this position benefits more from
athleticism. This is further supported by the coefficient for twenty-yard shuttle score (value: 2.889, p-value: 0.058985). This indicates, on average, a nearly three full point decrease in a
rookie’s PFF grade for a one-unit increase in twenty-yard shuttle score. The sharp drop in PFF
grade can be explained; the twenty-yard shuttle is a measurement of agility as well as speed, and
those abilities are incredibly valuable for the wide receiver position. The coefficient for fortyyard dash score further confirms that speed is paramount to a wide receivers’ success in the NFL,
as it is even lower than the coefficient for twenty-yard shuttle, and has more statistical
significance (value: -3.039, p-value: 0.041901). Interestingly, a one-unit increase in bench press
score increases a rookie wide receiver’s PFF grade more than either of the aforementioned event
scores (value: 5.168, p-value: 0.000925). From Figure 10, the high standard deviation and low
mean for bench press reps from the combine for wide receivers may explain some of the large
increase in PFF grade from an increase in bench press score; half of all wide receivers in the
dataset achieved less than or equal to fourteen reps on the bench press, only 25% of wide
receivers topped 15—it would only take a few stronger wide receivers with high PFF grades to
skew that result.
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Table 3 contains the results for the regression analysis performed upon the safeties subset, with
the regression equation below:
Model #3
Pff_Gradei = 0 + 1 Heighti + 2 Weighti + 3 40yd_scorei + 4 vert_scorei + 5 vert_scorei +

6 bench_scorei + 7 broad_scorei + 8 3cone_scorei + 9 shuttle_scorei + ui
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The R2 value from Table 3 reports a higher value than from Table 2, the regression model using
just the wide receivers, but reports a lower adjusted R2. The low adjusted R2 value is likely
explained by the fact that there were far fewer players listed as safeties in the full dataset than
there were wide receivers. In part, that is likely due to the fact that a large proportion of current
NFL safeties entered the league as cornerbacks—the cornerback in college to safety in the NFL
is a very common transition. From Table 3, the only combine event score that has a statistically
significant impact on rookie year PFF grade is the vertical jump score (p-value: <0.01). It shows
that a one-unit increase in a player’s vertical jump score leads to, on average, a nearly nine full
point increase in their rookie year PFF grade. While that may seem surprising, the way that plays
out on the field is logical: safeties are a defense’s last line of defense, they are the insurance that
keeps a good play from the offense turning into a great play. A higher vertical jump would allow
a safety that extra range and leaping ability to get a hand on a deep pass, get in a throwing lane,
or make a play that a player with an average vertical jump simply could not.
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Table 4 contains the results for the regression analysis performed upon the linebackers subset,
with the regression equation below:
Model #4
Pff_Gradei = 0 + 1 Heighti + 2 Weighti + 3 40yd_scorei + 4 vert_scorei + 5 vert_scorei +

6 bench_scorei + 7 broad_scorei + 8 3cone_scorei + 9 shuttle_scorei + ui
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Table 4 reports higher R2 and adjusted R2 values than any of the previous regression models
(0.739 and 0.549, respectively). The results from this regression model are not in-line with the
current thinking of the NFL. The recent shift in the league towards a passing-focused offensive
attack has led to countermeasures by defenses, and a popular move has been to play smaller,
faster players at the linebacker position. However, the results from Table 4 report that an
increase in a linebacker’s weight, and an increase in their bench press score—so their physical
strength—are the two areas that have a statistically significant positive impact on their rookie
year PFF grade. The coefficient for weight is quite small, only a 0.795-point increase in their
rookie year Pro Football Focus grade per pound of bodyweight, however from Figure 4, the
standard deviation for weight amongst linebackers was 7.1l pounds which means that the 0.795
points per pound of bodyweight can add up quickly. The increase in rookie year PFF grade
associated with a one-unit increase in bench press score (value: 3.381) represents a significant
change in rookie year outcome and is quite contradictory to what the NFL has been coveting in
linebackers.

5. Conclusion
The results of these models indicate significant implications for NFL franchises and their
owners and general managers. The NFL is a business, and just like any other. Tthe NFL is
interested in creating the largest profit possible by minimizing costs and maximizing the quality
of its product. In the NFL’s case, the best product is the performance of an individual during
play, and the showmanship that is associated with performing difficult athletic feats to give his
team the best chance to win a game. The league makes massive investments in players, look no
further than the current quarterback for the Kansas City Chiefs. At age twenty-five, the Chiefs
made Patrick Mahomes the highest paid professional football player ever when he signed a tenyear deal worth over half a billion U.S. dollars. However, the NFL differs from most other
businesses in other markets in a distinct way; when a real estate firm offers a contract to a
potential hire, the firm does not have to worry about the potential hire missing months or even
years of work due to bodily injury. That is an unwavering reality in the NFL—it is why the
average NFL contract is only three years in duration, and as a result franchises must do
everything in their power to ensure that their investment is rewarded. Using the results from this
analysis, it is possible for franchises to attempt to predict what level of productivity, or value, a
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team can expect from a given investment on a player. This can help teams to be able to more
consistently spend draft picks on players that will maximize their profitability.
For the enterprise of the NFL as a whole, the league may be interested in reassessing the
significance of some of the tests conducted in the combine. Some measurements of the NFL
combine have proven to lack significance as an indicator of player productivity, meaning that
more significant measures of a player’s athletic performance may need to be set in place for a
more accurate prediction of his return to a franchise. While it showed a significant impact on
rookie year PFF grades for certain positions, the 40-yard dash is an example of player
performance that has been over-valued in the selection of a player, similar to slugging percentage
in baseball. Teams have drafted players in the first round simply because they could run a
significant distance of the field in a straight line. Whether this comes in the form of a specific set
of events for each position, or the inclusion of new events, this is an area where the NFL could
improve to help teams make wiser draft investments.
Behavioral implications of the results also suggest that this may affect how prospects
may choose to approach different tests in the combine. Prospective players may now be
influenced to focus their training more toward tests that showed to be predictive of future
success. If a player were investing his assets in preparation for the combine to enhance his “draft
stock”, he may now weigh the opportunity cost of preparing for an event with low statistical
impact on his success over an event that is actually a superior predictor. Furthermore, the
findings from the position specific regression models indicate that the current direction of the
league may not be entirely optimal. The results reported in Table 4 are at odds with how the NFL
has been valuing linebackers. The NFL has been largely moving away from the linebacker
position, in favor of playing extra defensive backs, or even having a large safety play the
linebacker position. While this is not a call to return to the days of the two-down thumping
middle linebacker, perhaps the NFL should not be doing away with the position entirely.
Analytics can be applied to the NFL in so many different ways that are currently not
being utilized. In 2018, the Philadelphia Eagles, whose owner and general manager both have
backgrounds in economics, won the NFL championship, the Super Bowl. Following their win,
both spoke about their intent to implement analytics in their on-field play calling. This would be
the logical next step in the application of analytics to this sport. In further research, I may choose
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to collect data on the returns of different play calling, and I could use this to determine how
teams should invest each snap to receive the largest gain on each and every play.
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